Support the Ex-Im Bank: It Has Work to Do! by Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Ben Goodrich
The US Export-Import (Ex-Im) Bank is again
at the center of controversy, as Congress
debates the terms for its charter renewal.
This policy brief critiques provisions of the
House and Senate versions of the reautho-
rization bill and summarizes three justifi-
cations for Congress giving adequate sup-
port to the Ex-Im Bank. Box 1 provides a
capsule description of the Ex-Im Bank's op-
erations.
Justifications for the Ex-Im Bank1
Some critics argue that the Ex-Im Bank
should be scaled back or simply eliminated
because it is nothing more than a “corpo-
rate welfare” agency that subsidizes US ex-
ports.2 This criticism shortchanges the Ex-
Im Bank.
The Ex-Im Bank should be maintained
and indeed strengthened because it serves
three primary missions: 1) correcting ex-
aggerated risk assessments for exports to
developing countries, 2) increasing the
availability of export finance for small busi-
ness, and 3) providing the US Treasury le-
verage in international negotiations on
rules for official export credit agencies. In
order to achieve these three goals, the Ex-
Im Bank's resources need to be augmented
beyond the levels currently under consid-
eration.
Export Finance to Developing Countries
Even multinational corporations face
difficulties in financing exports to some de-
veloping countries, particularly in times of
political and financial unrest. Few troubled
countries in Africa or central Asia can se-
cure credits from private financial markets
to buy US exports. For these countries, mar-
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The Ex-Im Bank...
 serves three primary missions—
correcting exaggerated risk
assessments for exports to
developing countries, increasing
the availability of export finance
for small business, and providing
the US Treasury leverage in
international negotiations
on rules for official export
credit agencies.
1. This section draws heavily on Hufbauer (2001),
which in turn draws heavily on Hufbauer and




ket interest spreads over US Treasury bills or bonds
are very high (1,000 basis points or more)—that is if
private credit is available at all. Historically, the Ex-
Im Bank's default experience is much better than
market spreads might suggest.3 On average, private
financial markets are too skeptical of these coun-
tries. Helping to fill the gap, the Ex-Im Bank has
more than $4 billion worth of exposure to countries
that display the maximum risk rating as determined
by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD).
Moreover, the Ex-Im Bank helps restore confi-
dence in countries that are hit by financial crises.4
Box 2 summarizes the crisis in Korea during 1998.
As Southeast Asia and then Korea fell into crisis in
late 1997 and early 1998, private markets became
very skeptical about supporting exports to Asia. US
exports to Korea declined by one-third from 1997 to
1998. Of the $16 billion of US exports to Korea in
1998, almost $1 billion were supported by short-term
Ex-Im Bank credits.5  Prompt action by the Ex-Im
Bank directly helped US exporters during a difficult
time and indirectly helped both US exporters and
Korea by sending a strong signal to private financial
markets that Korea was a viable market, despite its
temporary crisis.
Export Finance for Small  Business
Small firms frequently have difficulty securing
export finance from commercial banks. They face
both country risk and size disadvantages. Develop-
ing countries are vulnerable to unexpected finan-
cial crises, so commercial banks are reluctant to
offer credits with repayment terms longer than one
year. But small businesses also have difficulty get-
ting export finance when selling to stable emerging
nations or even OECD markets. Giant banks focus
almost exclusively on giant companies, and medium-
sized banks do not have the resources to evaluate
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The Ex-Im Bank has existed since the Great De-
pression, basically to finance US exports. In FY2001,
the Ex-Im Bank provided $9.2 billion in financing to
support $12.5 billion of US exports—slightly over 1
percent of total US exports.1
   The Ex-Im Bank provides financing for US exports
in four ways:
First, the Ex-Im Bank provides 85 percent prin-
cipal and interest guarantees to back up the
credit of foreign buyers that take out commer-
cial loans to buy US exports. In FY2001, these
loan guarantees amounted to $5.4 billion.
Second, the Ex-Im Bank provides  “export credit
insurance” for US exporters to insure against
defaults by foreign purchasers who buy on credit.
This insurance covers 90 to 100 percent of the
principal, depending on the nature of the de-
fault risk. In FY2001, the Ex-Im Bank authorized
$2.3 billion in export credit insurance.
Third, the Ex-Im Bank offers direct loans to for-
eign buyers of US exports at fixed interest rates.
In FY2001, these direct loans were $870 million.
     Fourth, the Ex-Im Bank gives  “working capital
guarantees,” which are loan guarantees that cover
90 percent of the principal and interest on com-
mercial loans used by small and medium-sized
US firms to finance their exports. In FY2001, the
Ex-Im Bank provided $660 million in working capi-
tal guarantees.2
    The Ex-Im Bank makes a concerted effort to help
small businesses. Ninety percent of the authorized
transactions in FY2001 were to small businesses, and
the Ex-Im Bank has engaged in over 10,000 transac-
tions with small businesses in the past five years.
But small businesses receive slightly under 20 per-
cent of the Ex-Im Bank’s total financing.3
    The Ex-Im Bank provides financing for a wide vari-
ety of industries. In FY2001 the major areas of op-
eration were aircraft ($2.5 billion), environmental
products ($460 million), energy ($2.0 billion), high-
technology ($900 million), services ($690 million), and
agriculture ($120 million).4
2. Descriptions are based on Ex-Im Bank (1997) and
amounts are taken from Ex-Im Bank (2001a).
3. Ex-Im Bank (2001a).
4. Ex-Im Bank (2001b).
Note: For a detailed description of the Ex-Im Bank’s operations, see Hufbauer and Rodriguez (2001).
Box 1  The Ex-Im Bank at a glancex 1 The Ex-Im Bank at
a glance
1. Ex-Im Bank (2001a).
3. A spread of 1,000 basis points over Treasury rates implies
an annual default risk of 10 percent. This is much higher
than the 1.4 percent default rate that the Ex-Im Bank aver-
ages.
4. Lukas and Vásquez (2002) emphasize that the majority of
the Ex-Im Bank’s exposure is to countries that can obtain
private credit such as China, Mexico, Brazil, Turkey, Korea,
Indonesia, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, and Russia. But at times
each of these countries has endured spells where private
credit was unavailable. Moreover, these countries account
for a sizeable share of economic activity among developing
nations, and some of these countries still have high-risk rat-
ings. For a list of risk ratings, see OECD (2002). Other OECD
nations focus their export financing activity on these mar-
kets, which puts US exporters at a potential disadvantage.





•       May 2002 PB02-4 3
risk on international transactions. The Ex-Im Bank
helps correct these market failures.
Leverage
The Ex-Im Bank gives the United States lever-
age in international negotiations to eliminate ex-
port finance subsidies. One expert estimates that
$800 billion worth of exports are supported by export
credit agencies in 100 countries throughout the
world.6  The Ex-Im Bank is small compared to its in-
ternational counterparts both in terms of staff and
as a share of exports. If the Ex-Im Bank did not exist,
the United States would have little or no ability to
counter official export financing practices of foreign
governments.7 For example, the Ex-Im Bank  “chal-
lenges” tied aid offers from other governments by of-
fering matching terms so that US exporters are not
at a disadvantage. Progress has been achieved to-
ward reducing tied aid and other market distorting
practices by combining a ready-to-challenge Ex-Im
Bank with international negotiations that have suc-
cessively refined the OECD Arrangement on Guide-
lines for Officially Supported Export Credits. But the
current OECD Arrangement has not kept up with
three newly invented distortions—1) so-called  “mar-
ket windows,” 2) de facto tied aid that is character-
ized as untied aid, and 3) interest make-up
schemes.8
“Market windows” are hybrids of public and pri-
vate banks. They are partially public because they
receive funding from the government to cover ad-
ministrative costs and they enjoy tax breaks and gov-
ernment loan guarantees. But they are partially pri-
vate because they offer credit to the private sector
at interest rates that are designed to earn a healthy
rate of return. Market windows in foreign countries,
especially Canada and Germany, claim that they are
not bound by the OECD Arrangement.
Untied aid is a misnomer because recipients
know full well that the prospects for receiving more
“untied aid” in the future will sharply diminish if
they do not use today's money to buy exports from
the donor country. Aid that is explicitly tied is regu-
lated by the OECD Arrangement, but de facto tied
aid is not. Thus, some countries—notably Japan—
successfully use de facto tied aid to subsidize their
exports.
 “Interest make-up” occurs when governments
fully guarantee commercial loans and pay the com-
mercial banks a commission of 40 to 150 basis points
for making the loan. When the commission exceeds
the commercial risk, the commercial bank can of-
fer especially attractive terms to private-sector buy-
ers. This practice is essentially an export subsidy,
since governments are providing an extra incentive
to commercial banks.
Market windows, de facto tied aid, and interest
make-up schemes all distort markets and should be
prohibited, but unilateral disarmament is not a win-
ning strategy. The Ex-Im Bank essentially serves
as a negotiating chip: the United States will limit
the operations of the Ex-Im Bank only when foreign
governments regulate their own market distorting
practices. If the United States unilaterally curtails
Box 2   The Ex-Im Bank during the
           Korean financial crisis of 1998
Virtually no exports were being shipped to
Korea in the immediate aftermath of the crisis.
The Ex-Im Bank worked with several Korean
banks to insure letters of credit, which enabled
Korean industrial firms to buy US exports.
The Ex-Im Bank facilitated 2,460 transactions
with Korea in the first nine months of 1998.
The Ex-Im Bank supported $920 million out of
the $16 billion of total US exports to Korea in
1998.
Note: This information is based in part on a telephone
conversation on April 23, 2002, between Gary Hufbauer
and James Harmon, the former president of the Ex-Im
Bank.
6. Gianturco (2001, 1).
7. Also, the Ex-Im Bank is unique in that it insists that the
projects it supports meet World Bank standards for environ-
mental and social impact. Downsizing the Ex-Im Bank
would severely hamper US efforts at persuading other
export credit agencies to adopt environmental and social
impact standards. 8. See Mendelowitz (2001) and Evans and Oye (2001).
To better meet the Ex-Im Bank's
multiple mandates, we advocate
a larger authorization—enough
to support at least $15 billion
of US exports annually.
This would require budget
authorization of about
$6 billion over five years.
•
•
        •
•the Ex-Im Bank, foreign governments will be tempted
to expand their export financing subsidies.
Current State of Legislation and
Recommendations
The charter for the Ex-Im Bank expired at the
end of FY2001 and the Bank has since operated un-
der continuing resolutions. For FY2003, the Ex-Im
Bank estimates that it will need to support $11.5 bil-
lion in US exports, and President Bush's budget en-
dorses this request. Even with this level of export-
supporting capability, the President's budget request
for FY2003 is actually lower than in earlier years
($541 million for FY2003 versus $727 million for
FY2002) because the Office of Management and Bud-
get (OMB) changed the rules for scoring international
risk, lowering the amount of budget authorization
needed to finance the Ex-Im Bank's operations.9  To
better meet the Ex-Im Bank's multiple mandates, we
advocate a larger authorization—enough to support
at least $15 billion of US exports annually. This would
require budget authorization of about $6 billion over
five years.10
Both the House and the Senate are considering
versions of a bill that would extend the Ex-Im Bank's
charter.  In the Senate, the bill (S. 1372) was unani-
mously reported out of the Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs on August 3, 2001, and
passed on the Senate floor on March 14, 2002. In the
House, the corresponding bill (H.R. 2871) was reported
out of the Committee on Financial Services on
Novemer 15, 2001, and passed on the House floor as
an amendment to the Senate bill on May 1, 2002.
The two versions are similar, but there are signifi-
cant differences between the two bills that will need
to be resolved by the House-Senate Conference Com-
mittee; important potential changes to the existing
charters are summarized in table 1.
Duration
The Senate version reauthorizes the Ex-Im Bank
through September 30, 2006, one year longer than
the House version. We prefer 2006 because a new
Ex-Im president—appointed by the US President
elected in 2004—will have been in the saddle for at
least a year by 2006 when the next reauthorization
comes around.
Tied Aid
In spring 2000, a US company lost an export deal
to an Austrian competitor that benefited from tied
aid. The Ex-Im Bank initially decided to match the
level of tied aid. After the Treasury Department pro-
tested, however, the Ex-Im Bank changed its posi-
tion. Although this type of flap has only occurred
once, it was a cause celebre, and the Ex-Im Bank
and the Treasury Department reached a mutual
agreement on how future disagreements will be
handled. Nevertheless, the House version of the Ex-
Im Bank reauthorization bill goes further by prohib-
iting the Treasury Department from overruling the
Ex-Im Bank's judgment on tied aid challenges.11 Al-
though it is important for the United States to chal-
lenge tied aid, we believe the current agreement
between the Treasury Department and the Ex-Im
Bank is sufficient to meet these concerns. The Trea-
sury Department has the responsibility of represent-
ing the United States at the OECD in export credit
negotiations.  In our view, it is more important for
the United States to have a single agency with
the final voice both on negotiations and retaliation.
This is more important than Monday morning criti-
cism of the Treasury's questionable decision in a
single prior case.
Market Windows
Both the House and Senate versions of the bill
explicitly authorize the Ex-Im Bank to treat market
window financing as if it were tied aid and to match
the terms offered by market windows in other coun-
tries. Under current law, the Ex-Im Bank might be
able to match market-window offers anyway, but we
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 9. Ex-Im Bank (2002). Revised and more realistic budget scor-
ing was recommended in Hufbauer and Rodriguez (2001), and
we endorse the OMB’s reforms.
10. The $6 billion figure is calculated by taking the House
version of the bill, adjusting it for a five-year authorization,
increasing the support for exports, and allowing for infla-
tion and small increases in export support. We also support
the language in the House version of the Ex-Im Bank reau-
thorization bill that increases direct spending on tied aid,
which requires “pay-as you-go” budget rules.
[B]oth the House and
Senate versions of the bill seek to
increase the percentage of financial
support that small businesses
receive. This move is good because
large corporations can, as a rule,
conduct international business
without the aid of government.
11. The Senate’s position on this issue is not entirely clear.
There is no language  in the S. 1372 bill on Treasury Depart-
ment review, but the report by the Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs curiously interprets the existing
agreement between the Treasury Department and the Ex-Im
Bank as giving the final say to the Ex-Im Bank.       May 2002 PB02-4 5
support the move to make the matching option ex-
plicit. Both versions also direct the Treasury Depart-
ment to attempt to negotiate an OECD agreement
on market windows and report to Congress within
two years on the results of its endeavor.12 By autho-
rizing the Ex-Im Bank to challenge market win-
dows, the prospects for reaching an agreement at
the OECD on market windows are improved. At a
minimum, the US negotiating objective should re-
quire OECD countries to disclose in advance the
terms offered by market windows, using standards
of transparency similar to the agreed disclosure re-
quirements for tied aid.
Small Business
Under the current law, the Ex-Im Bank must
allocate 10 percent of its financial resources to
Table 1  Summary of Senate and House versions of Ex-Im Bank reauthorization bills
Senate House Our
Note   Provision version version recommendation
  (1) Length of reauthorization Through 2006 Through 2005 Senate
  (2) Matching of offers by market Authorized Authorized Agree
   windows
  (3) Date for annual competitiveness Due June 30 Due June 30 Agree
             report
  (4) Treasury Department review of No language in No Treasury Status quo
   tied aid actions    current bill   veto   is sufficient
  (5) Small business threshold 18 percent of 20 percent of Agree
   total value   total value
  (6) Subject to an unfair trade order No language in Firm is not House
    current bill    eligible
  (7) Subject to a preliminary unfair No language in Requires the Senate
    trade finding     current bill    Ex-Im Bank
   to develop
   procedures
  (8) Employment objective No requirement Required Senate
  (9) Cost $3.4 billion $3.3 billion About $6 billion
(10) Pay-as-you-go rules required No Yes House
(11) Outstanding credits permitted $75 billion Over $100 House
                 at one time                                                                                            billion
Notes:
 (1) Length of reauthorization is the amount of time the Ex-Im bank would be permitted to operate under its charter.
 (2) We also support the directives to the Treasury Department to negotiate a market windows agreement.
 (3) The Ex-Im Bank submits an annual competitiveness report, but there is currently no specific due date.
 (4) The Treasury Department currently comments on Ex-Im Bank recommendations regarding tied aid.
 (5) The small business threshold is the percentage of credit the Ex-Im Bank must give to small businesses.
 (6) In practice, foreign applicants that are under an unfair trade order do not receive Ex-Im Bank assistance.
 (7) An unfair trade investigation is preliminary and the respondent enjoys a presumption of innocence until shown
     otherwise.
 (8) House version says that Bank actions should maintain or increase employment of US workers.
 (9) Congressional Budget Office cost estimate, based on Office of Management and Budget scoring criteria.
Sources: Committee on Financial Services (2001); Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (2001); and
  the bills (H.R. 2871 and S. 1372) available at http://thomas.loc.gov.
12. In addition to this report, both versions of the Ex-Im
Bank reauthorization bill require the Ex-Im Bank to submit
its annual report by June 30 of each year. We support this
deadline because it would give Congress the opportunity to
review the annual report before making budget authorizations
for the next fiscal year.
The Senate version is calculated on the basis of a 5-year reauthorization and the House version is calculated on
the basis of a 4-year reauthorization. Both the Senate and House versions contemplate initial support of $11.4
billion of exports annually. Our recommendation is based on a 5-year reauthorization and contemplates initial
support of $15 billion of exports annually.
(10) Pay-as-you-go rules are required if the bill affects direct spending, which the House version does on tied aid.
(11) Outstanding credits are the maximum amount of exposure that the Ex-Im Bank can have due to past and present
     operations. This ceiling is distinct from the budget authorization needed to support new operations in a fiscal
      year.May 2002 6 PB02-4
small businesses. Although the Ex-Im Bank cur-
rently exceeds that threshold, both the House and
Senate versions of the bill seek to increase the per-
centage of financial support that small businesses
receive. This move is good because large corpora-
tions can, as a rule, conduct international business
without the aid of government. The exception to this
rule is that even large businesses sometimes have
difficulty getting financing for transactions with de-
veloping countries. However, the 18 to 20 percent
small business “set-asides” in the House and Sen-
ate bills still leave plenty of room to handle worth-
while export deals by large companies operating in
developing countries.
Coordination with US Unfair Trade Remedies
Currently, if a foreign applicant for a loan or guar-
antee is subject to a US countervailing duty or anti-
dumping order, the Ex-Im Bank will not approve the
application. The House version writes this policy into
law and directs the Ex-Im Bank to develop procedures
for dealing with firms subject to a preliminary find-
ing of an unfair trade law violation. We oppose this
directive because it contemplates the punishment
of the foreign applicant even before a final determi-
nation has been made that the firm is guilty of vio-
lating US unfair trade laws.
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